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NOTES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED
SPECIES UNDER C.I.T.E.S.: DIRECT LISTING
VS. REVERSE LISTING
The member countries attending the 1981 meeting of the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora1 adopted an Australian resolution.2 The resolution
called for a study to look into restructuring the listing process cur-
rently used for regulating international trade in endangered species.3
Instead of continuing the policy of listing those species which are
endangered or threatened, the proposal recommends listing only
those species which are not endangered or threatened.4 The aim of
the proposal is to facilitate the process of identification,and control.5
Although reverse listing is not a new procedure, its use in the past
has been limited largely to areas of consumer and environmental
concerns,6 where the listed item is considered dangerous rather than
1. The term "Convention" will be used to refer to the entity comprised of member
countries of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora. The term "C.I.T.E.S." will be used to refer to the treaty originally
adopted by the Convention in 1973. See infra note 10.
The Convention meets approximately every two years. The third meeting, during
which Australia submitted a resolution to study restructuring the listing process, was held
in New Delhi, India from February 25 to March 8, 1981. Fifty-five countries attended
the meeting as parties; 18 countries, the United Nations Environment Programme, and
numerous other organizations attended as observers. See Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Third Meeting of the Confer-
ence of the Parties, Part. 3.1 and 3.2 (New Delhi, India, Feb. 25-March 8, 1981) [herein-
after cited as New Delhi Proceedings].
2. See New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 1, Plen. 3.9, at 1-2. The Australian pro-
posal was adopted by a vote of 28 to 7 with 6 abstentions. Id at 2.
3. See New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 1, Doc. 3.30.1.
4. This approach is called "reverse" or "clean" listing. See New Delhi Proceedings,
supra note 1, Doc. 3.30, at 1. This Note will refer to the approach as reverse listing.
5. See New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 1, Doc. 3.30.1.
6. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1976)
(requiring regulations listing drugs exempt from operation of the Act); and Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1976) (subjecting all pesti-
cides to the provisions of the Act except those the administrator lists as exempt under
§ 136w(b)). One may argue that wildlife laws protect the public from exotic diseases.
See infra note 64. This argument does not imply, however, that reverse listing would
better protect the public from exotic diseases than would direct listing. See infra note 63
and accompanying text.
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endangered.
The adoption of reverse listing would require major adjust-
ments in the procedures used to implement and enforce C.I.T.E.S.,
both in the United States and internationally. Because the interna-
tional regulation of trade in wildlife under previous laws was largely
ineffective,7 and because C.I.T.E.S. is considered by some to be very
effective," the Convention should adopt reverse listing only after
careful scrutiny and consideration.9
This Note discusses C.I.T.E.S. and its implementation in the
United States, and then examines the effects of reverse listing on the
present system. Following an evaluation of the goals of the Conven-
tion, the Note concludes that direct listing is the preferable system
for regulating international trade in wildlife.
I
BACKGROUND
A. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora10 is a treaty aimed at controlling interna-
tional trade in specimens"1 of species which currently are, or soon
Wildlife laws which use a form of listing similar to reverse listing do exist. Such laws
generally prohibit the killing or trapping of wildlife with listed exceptions. These laws
differ from reverse listing laws in that the exceptions are usually very limited in quantity.
See, e.g., Tahquitz National Game Preserve Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 689-689(c) (1976).
7. See, e.g., Grove, Wild Cargo: The Business of Smuggling Animals, 159 NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC 287 (March, 1981). Cf, Travalio and Clement, International Protection of
Marine Mammals, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 199, 222 (1979). Messrs. Travalio and Clem-
ent discuss a number of treaties which deal with the international treatment of whales.
They claim that C.I.T.E.S. is ineffective in dealing with many problems of international
wildlife. The authors explain that the treaty's weakness is not related to the listing pro-
cess, but to the ability of countries to abstain from certain of the treaty's provisions. Id
at 223. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 7, at 309. Mr. Groves article is a study of big game
smuggling. His analysis and research include a study of C.I.T.E.S. and its effects on the
smuggling of wild animals.
9. The Australian proposal recommends an examination of the implications and
ramifications of reverse listing. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 1, Doc. 3.30.1. Aus-
tralia is to coordinate input from all parties, including the United States, in order to
prepare a final paper to go to the Technical Expert Committee. Id, Plen. 3.9, at 2.
10. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, done July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249 [hereinafter cited as
C.I.T.E.S.]. Thirty-eight countries participated in the original signing of the Convention
in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 1973. The United States Senate ratified the treaty on
September 13, 1973. 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1085 (1973). There are presently 76
parties to the treaty. Telephone interview with Art Lazarowitz, acting Chief of the Man-
agement Operations Branch, Federal Wildlife Permit Office (Jan. 18, 1982).
11. The term "specimens" includes animals, dead or alive, and parts thereof. 68
DEP'T ST. BULL. 628 (April 5, 1973), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1085
(1973).
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may be, in danger of becoming extinct. 12 It includes three appendi-
ces that order and list species according to the extent to which they
are endangered. Each appendix specifies the degree of regulation
and protection necessary for the species listed therein.13 Appendix I
lists the species most vulnerable to extinction. It includes "all species
threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade." 14
Trade in specimens of these species can be authorized only in
"exceptional circumstances,"' 15 and is never authorized when the
specimen is to be used primarily for commercial purposes.16
Appendix II consists of two sub-categories: species that are
somewhat less threatened than those in Appendix I, but nevertheless
warrant strict regulation; and species that are so similar to others
listed in the Appendix that they must be regulated in order to accom-
plish effective control. 17 The treaty permits trade in these species
only after the Scientific Authority 8 of the exporting country has
determined "that such export will not be detrimental to the survival
of that species."' 19 The Scientific Authority must monitor the levels
of export of any listed species in order to "maintain that species
12. Id The first United States law dealing generally with federal wildlife regulation
was the Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 42-
44 (1976)). The Lacey Act prohibited the interstate transportation of any wild animals or
birds that had been killed in violation of state law. Environmental Law Institute, THE
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, 20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as E.L.I.].
The Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926
(repealed 1973), was the first United States law to authorize habitat protection. In 1969
this Act was supplemented by the Endangered Species Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
135, 83 Stat. 275, to include restrictions on the importation of wildlife threatened with
worldwide extinction. E.L.I., supra at 371-375.
C.I.T.E.S. covers amphibians, mammals, reptiles, birds and plants. The exact extent of
trade in a particular endangered species is frequently indeterminable, as at times each
specimen is counted, while at other times only shipments of specimens of a species are
counted. In 1977, however, customs officials recorded illegal trade in over 1,000,000
items (excluding plants), plus leather and skins. WILDLIFE PERMIT OFFICE, UNITED
STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA,
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1977, at 11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977 WILDLIFE PERMIT
OFFICE REPORT].
13. Commentators indicate that C.I.T.E.S. recognition of varying degrees of endan-
germent and the regulatory provisions which reflect these differences are the treaty's most
significant innovations. E.L.I., supra note 12, at 380. The three appendices contain an
aggregate of 1,549 species of wildlife (excluding plants). Telephone interview with David
Mack, Assistant Director, TRAFFIC (U.S.A.) (Jan. 18, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Mack
interview].
14. C.I.T.E.S., supra note 10, art. 11(1).
15. Id C.I.T.E.S. does not define the term "exceptional circumstances."
16. Id art. III(3)(c).
17. Id art. 11(2).
18. Each Convention member must delegate at least one Scientific Authority and at
least one Management Authority. Id art. IX(l). In the United States the Secretary of
the Interior performs both functions. 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a)(Supp. 1980).
19. C.I.T.E.S., supra note 10, art. IV(2)(a).
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throughout its range at a level consistent with its role in the ecosys-
tems in which it occurs. '20 The treaty further requires that whenever
it determines that exports in such species should be limited, the Sci-
entific Authority "shall advise the appropriate Management Author-
ity21 of suitable measures to be taken to limit the grant of export
permits for specimens of that species." 22
Appendix III lists those species that a party23 to the Convention
designates "as being subject to regulation within [the designating
party's] jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting
exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of other parties in the
control of trade."24 An importer of these species must present a
"certificate of origin and, where the import is from a State which has
included that species in Appendix III, an export permit. '25 This pro-
vision discourages the smuggling of that species from the listing
country by limiting available foreign sales markets. By discouraging
smuggling, a country can better manage the species it has listed in
Appendix III and effectively reduce the possibility of relegating the
species to Appendices I or II. The Convention recognizes that "peo-
ples and states are and should be the best protectors of their own
wild fauna and flora,"' 26 and endeavors to help individual countries
take the measures necessary to preserve their own ecosystems.27
A two-thirds vote of the members present and voting is required
to amend Appendices I and 11.28 Any member country may add a
species to Appendix III or withdraw any species it has designated.29
Signatory countries may not make any general reservations30 to
C.I.T.E.S.' provisions.3' Members may, however, enter specific res-
ervations to species in any of the appendices. 32 In effect, the reserva-
tion provision represents a major weakness in C.I.T.E.S. because it
allows any country with an economic interest in exploiting a species
20. Id art. IV(3).
21. See supra note 18. C.I.T.E.S. expects the scientific and management authorities
to work together in coordinating and implemefiting policies.
22. C.I.T.E.S., supra note 10, art. IV(3).
23. The term "party" means "any State for which the ... Convention has entered
into force." Id art. 1(h).
24. Id art. 11(3)..
25. Id art. V(3).
26. Id at preamble.
27. Id
28. Id art. XV(1), (6).
29. Id art. XVI(l), (3).
30. A reservation is a "unilateral statement ... made by a State, when signing [or]
ratifying a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to vary the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, art. II(l)(d), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1970).
31. C.I.T.E.S., supra note 10, art. XXIII(l).
32. Id art. XXIII(2).
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to override the ecological, aesthetic, and moral purposes of the
lists.3 3 The treaty does encourage signatory countries to adopt
domestic regulations that are stricter than C.I.T.E.S. requires.34
The treaty also contains provisions dealing with non-member
countries. When trading in specimens from a non-member country,
the exporter/importer must show "comparable documentation
issued by the competent authorities in that state which substantially
conforms with the requirements of the present Convention for per-
mits" for any species listed in the appendices.3 5 Through these pro-
visions the Convention attempts to control ,international trade in
listed species in as many countries as possible.
B. ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the Endangered Species Act (Act)36 func-
tions as the enforcement mechanism for C.I.T.E.S. The Act provides
that "[i]t is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States to engage in any trade in any specimens contrary to
the provisions of the Convention."37
Under the Act,38 the Secretary of the Interior, with the aid of an
advisory commission,39 implements C.I.T.E.S. in the United States.
33. Travalio and Clement, supra note 7, at 222-23; Grove, supra note 7, at 309. For
example, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany, and Switzerland all take exception to the
listing of saltwater crocodiles because those countries process the skins into leather
goods. Since they make most of the world's crocodile-skin products, their reservations
undermine C.I.T.E.S.' attempt to protect saltwater crocodiles. Id See generally, Note,
Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Species Convention: Reservations Regarding the
Reservation Clauses, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429 (1981).
34. C.LT.E.S., supra note 10, art. XIV.
35. Id art. X.
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976) as amended by Endangered Species Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(c)(1). The maximum penalty for violations is $20,000 and.one
year in jail. Id § 1540(b)(1).
38. "The Secretary [of the Interior] shall do all things necessary and appropriate to
carry out the functions of the Management Authority ... [and] the Scientific Authority
under the Convention." Id § 1537a(b), (c) (Supp. IV 1980).
39. Id § 1537a(d) (Supp. IV 1980). The International Convention Advisory Com-
mission is composed of members appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary
of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the National Science Founda-
tion, and the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. Id
The Secretary has delegated his duties regarding international trade in mammals,
amphibians, reptiles, and birds to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in the
Department ofthe Interior. The Service allows eight ports of entry for specimens of such
wildlife and has assigned specialized agents and inspectors to those ports. 1977 WILD-
LIFE PERMIT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
The Secretary has delegated his duties regarding international trade in plants to the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service in the Department of Agriculture. The
Service allows fourteen ports of entry and has assigned specialized personnel to monitor
those ports. WILDLIFE PERMIT OFFICE, UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDAN-
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The Act requires that any changes in the lists of species be published
in the Federal Register.4° The Secretary of the Interior must also
publish in the Federal Register explanations of decisions not to list
particular species.41
The Act requires the publication of two lists: one for species
considered to be threatened and one for species that are endan-
gered.42 The Secretary of the Interior classifies species "on the basis
of the best scientific and commercial data available," after consulta-
tion with all interested parties, states, and foreign governments.4 3
If a species is listed as endangered, it cannot be imported to, or
exported from, the United States."4 It is also illegal for any person
subject to United States jurisdiction to possess, sell, deliver, carry,
transport or offer for sale any endangered species.45 While there are
exceptions to these prohibitions, they are limited.4 6 If a species is
considered threatened, the Secretary of the Interior "shall issue such
regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of such species." 47
United States customs officials and specialized inspectors
enforce the Act and C.I.T.E.S.4s They must be able to recognize and
distinguish species during importation into, or exportation from,
GERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1979, at IN-3 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 WILDLIFE PERMIT OFFICE REPORT].
40. Any party to the Convention can protect species not listed. C.I.T.E.S., supra note
10, art. XIV. The Endangered Species Act provides for additional listings. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533 (Supp. IV 1980).
41. Id § 1537a(d)(7). The Secretary of the Interior must publish reasons for not list-
ing a particular species.
42. Id § 1533(c)(1). As of January 1981, the Secretary of the Interior listed 750 spe-
cies as threatened or endangered, including 493 species of mammals and birds and 60
species of plants. ENDANGERED SPECIES TECHNICAL BULLETIN, January 1981, at 8.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
44. Id § 1538(a)(1)(A).
45. Id § 1538(a)(1)(D), (E) and (F). Between October 1, 1976 and September 30,
1977, there were 482 civil convictions and 36 criminal convictions under the Endangered
Species Act. Agents reported 1205 violations, fifty percent of which were related to ille-
gal trade in elephant ivory. 1977 WILDLIFE PERMIT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
Most violations occurred at the port of entry in San Francisco; nearly all of the other
major violations occurred at New York City. Id
Between October 1, 1978 and September 30, 1979, there were 2,327 civil convictions
under the Act, and over $500,000 worth of wildlife specimens were confiscated. 1979
WILDLIFE PERMIT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 39, at VII.
46. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1976). These exceptions include use for scientific
purposes, for the alleviation of specific instances of economic hardship, and for subsis-
tence purposes by Alaskans. Id
47. 14 § 1533(d). The regulations include provisions for instituting trade restrictions
and habitat protections.
48. 1977 WILDLIFE PERMIT OFFICE REPORT, .pra note 12, at 7. See also supra note
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United States ports of entry.49 Although there have been species
identification problems in the past,50 intensive training programs and
a new emphasis on strict enforcement have improved the customs
officials' ability to recognize species.5' While the flow of illegal items
into the United States has not ended, these improvements have
caused a noticeable decrease in the importation of protected
species.52
II
REVERSE LISTING PROPOSAL
C.I.T.E.S. presently lists approximately 700s5 of the over 10,000
species of plants, birds, mammals, reptiles and amphibians actively
traded on the international market.54 If the Convention adopts the
Australian reverse listing proposal, the resulting list would by impli-
cation contain nearly 9,700 species.55
The importation of species is a large scale operation. Approxi-
mately 422,000 live birds, 1,100,000 reptiles and amphibians,
11,800,000 wildlife hides and skins, and 129,600,000 individual items
made from wildlife were imported into the United States during
1977.56 The system of control must be practicable in order to pre-
vent smuggling when such large numbers of specimens are traded.57
49. See generally Grove, supra note 8 (discussion of customs officials' duties under
the Act).
50. A United States customs official revealed: "Until recently, few of us [customs
officials] knew one species from another. ... You just sort of glanced at the shipping
papers that came with them and waved them on through." Id at 294.
51. Id at 294-296, 308-309. To help ease the enforcement problems, persons
engaged in importing or exporting fish or wildlife as a business, are required to be
licensed, to keep records and to follow reporting procedures. The licenses are revocable
upon violation of the Endangered Species Act. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 13.51(a)(3), 14.93(0
(1980). The Convention is in the process of writing an instruction manual to provide
basic information and illustrations of species for Management Authorities. This manual
will include regional as well as global information. See New Delhi Proceedings, supra
note 1, Doc. 3.11.
52. See generally Grove, supra note 7.
53. 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1085, 1096 (1973). This is not a completely accurate
figure as many similar species are lumped together in the appendices. The actual
number of species may be as high as 1500. Mack interview, supra note 13.
54. This low estimate of the number of species is based on a conglomeration of"
figures. There are over 13,000 birds and mammals in existence. See Grove, supra note 7,
at 294. If only one-half of these species enter into international trade, then 6500 species
of birds and mammals must be listed. Over 3500 species of amphibians, reptiles, fish and
plants are traded. Mack interview, supra note 13. Therefore, 10,000 species is a mini-
mum estimate of the number of species actively traded.
55: The 300 species now listed in Appendix I would not be listed under the reverse
listing format. The estimated 9,300 currently unlisted species and the 400 species listed
in Appendices II and III result in an estimated 9,700 species to be listed under the reverse
listing format. See supra notes 53-54.
56. Grove, supra note 7, at 293.
57. For figures on smuggling see supra note 45.
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The Australian proposal identified three problems under the current
listing system that hamper such control:
1) identification of species that demand varying degrees of control;
2) identification of subspecies requiring management and trade limitations;
and
3) classification, validation and enforcement. 58
Reverse listing would help to resolve problems in the first area
of concern. Under the present system customs officials must prove
that the specimen is from a listed species, while the importer/
exporter attempts to prove that the specimen is from an unlisted spe-
cies. Thus, the importer/exporter has little incentive to cooperate
with the official. Reverse listing would shift the burden of proving
that a species is listed from the customs official to the importer/
exporter, who would then have considerable incentive to cooperate
in the identification process. However, reverse listing would be no
panacea for the identification problem; arguably, if the Australian
proposal was implemented, smugglers would attempt to categorize
specimens from unlisted species as specimens from listed species.
The Australian proposal recommends two or more lists of spe-
cies classified according to levels of restriction on trade.5 9 Thus,
reverse listing would alleviate the second problem identified in the
proposal by requiring an affirmative showing that no restriction or
only a limited restriction on trade in a particular subspecies is neces-
sary for the protection of that subspecies.60 Subspecies would not be
harmed by an inadvertant lack of investigation, because countries
would be forced to justify trade in a subspecies before trade would
be allowed.61
Reverse listing would not be as helpful in solving the third
problem identified in the Australian proposal. Many species are
similar and difficult to classify and validate. With approximately
9,700 species listed, the process might be impracticable for customs
officials. Similarities between listed and unlisted species will con-
tinue to exist and customs officials still must ultimately decide which
specie a specimen most resembles. This remains a difficult determi-
nation under either listing system.
58. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 1, Doc. 3.30.1.
59. Id, Doc. 3.30 at 2.
60. Id at 1.
61. Currently, the United States prefers to concentrate "more resources on the actual
recovery of species already listed as endangered." N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1981, at A24, ol.
4 (discussion with Harold J. O'Connor, Deputy Director of the Interior Department's
Fish and Wildlife Service). Under reverse listing, the U.S. would have to allocate
resources to the investigation of requests to list species for unrestricted or partially
restricted trade. Private parties desiring to trade in an unlisted species might aid in such
investigations. See infra text following note 64.
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III
CURRENT USES OF REVERSE LISTING
Most of the wildlife acts which list species use the direct listing
method. 62 Federal acts utilizing reverse listing generally regulate
insecticides, drugs and other dangerous and manmade substances.
63
Because these substances require exceptionally stringent controls,
only those that have been tested and found safe are listed. Manmade
products may be produced quickly; therefore, the government pre-
fers to assume that all drugs and pesticides are unsafe until proven
otherwise. Conversely, wildlife is relatively stable; problems with
identified species are usually known and the discovery of new species
occurs infrequently.64
Drug and pesticide laws employ reverse listing in order to place
the burden of proving safety on the producers, who must spend the
necessary time and money in order to secure listing. Reverse listing
of wildlife would accomplish the same result. Private parties who
are financially interested in importing or exporting a species would
perform the necessary investigation on the ecological impacts of
trade in that species. This shift of burden would present two
problems. First, the economic cost would still exist. Instead of the
public paying for the research through taxes, consumers would pay
for it through higher prices. Second, drug and pesticide producers
can obtain patents on products and copyrights on names, while wild-
life traders cannot acquire such protections against competitors. The
potential for some traders to benefit from the efforts of others to
achieve the listing of a species might operate as a disincentive to the
expenditure of time and money for the examination of the impact of
trade in that species.
Recently, the International Council for Bird Preservation 6s
62. See, e.g., The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1976); The
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976). Cf., Protection and
Conservation of Wildlife Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(c) (1976); andsupra note 6 and accom-
panying text. Several countries use reverse listing for wildlife protection laws. Examples
are Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Uruguay. New Delhi Proceedings, supra
note I, Plen. Doc. 3.9.
63. See upra note 6.
64. Occurrences of unexpected disasters from wildlife importation are rare. One
instance involved the outbreak of Newcastel disease, which is transmitted by exotic birds,
and is fatal to domestic poultry. Controlling the outbreak of the disease cost California
56 million dollars in 1971. Grove, supra note 7, at 294.
65. The International Council for Bird Preservation meets every four years. Eight-
een member countries, including the United States, Canada, Japan, Great Britain,
France, and South Africa, and several organizations meet to "stimulate interest in all
countries for a more adequate protection of wild birdfife." 12 BULLETIN OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR BIRD PRESERVATION, at 13 (1975).
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unanimously adopted reverse listing.66 During its sixteenth World
Conference in 1974,67 the Council voted to support both C.I.T.E.S.68
and the concept of reverse listing.69 During the Council's 1978 meet-
ing it strengthened its stand in favor of reverse listing and passed a
resolution calling for C.I.T.E.S. to adopt reverse listing.70 The pri-
mary reason underlying the resolution was "the increasing practical
problems involved in identifying the numerous species listed for
varying degrees of control.171
IV
EVALUATION OF THE REVERSE LISTING
PROPOSAL
A. GOAL COMPARISON
The Convention should adopt the reverse listing proposal only
if reverse listing affords easy enforcement of trade restrictions72 and
satisfies the objectives of C.I.T.E.S. and the Endangered Species Act
more effectively than does direct listing.
1. Ease of Enforcement
It would probably be easier to enforce trade restrictions under
reverse listing than under direct listing. Reverse listing would make
it easier for customs officials to identify unfamiliar specimens,
because, to avoid confiscation, the importer/exporter will aid the
customs official by attempting to show that the species in question is
listed.73 An importer/exporter attempting to smuggle restricted
specimens would have to prove that the specimens were from listed
species. Proving that a specimen from an unlisted species has the
exact characteristics of a listed species would be more difficult than
the smuggler's task under the direct listing format, where the
importer/exporter need only distinguish the specimen from a perfect
example of a listed species.
66. Id at 66. (Resolution 10 was unanimously adopted by the International Council
for Bird Preservation, urging the Convention to "1l]ist the species which [it] will allow to
be exported or imported.")
67. Id at 51.
68. Id at 66, resolution 10(a).
69. Id at 66, resolution 10(b).
70. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 1, Doc. 3.30 at 1.
71. Id
72. Grove, supra note 7, at 309. If customs officials cannot enforce C.I.T.E.S., the
treaty is worthless. Only if its provisions can be easily enforced will the objectives of
C.I.T.E.S. be furthered.
73. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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2. The Focus on Endangered Species
The major disadvantage of the reverse listing format is that it
de-emphasizes the protection of endangered species. Direct listing
focuses attention on individual species that are endangered or
threatened,74 while reverse listing relegates those species to the back-
ground. The House Report on the Endangered Species Act recog-
nized the need for emphasizing the endangered species. "The
ultimate goal of the Endangered Species Act is to focus sufficient
attention on listed species, so that, in time, they can be returned to a
healthy state and removed from the list."'75
Reverse listing emphasizes preventive protection, assuming that
a species is endangered unless proven otherwise. It attempts to pre-
vent non-endangered species from becoming endangered, and to
identify species which should be considered endangered, but which
have not been so designated. Because each country has limited
resources with which to protect wildlife, priorities must govern the
allocation of resources. The priorities of C.I.T.E.S. lie in protecting
endangered species,76 and helping countries control smuggling.77
Reverse listing does not satisfy either of these goals more effectively
than does direct listing.
3. Different Degrees of Protection
The C.I.T.E.S. appendices provide different degrees of protec-
tion,78 a practice which the Australian resolution proposes to con-
tinue.79 Reverse listing, however, will tend to minimize such
protections. Categorizing 9,700 species,80 in varying degrees,
presents more difficulties than categorizing 700 species. Reverse list-
ing could also cause identification problems among similar species
and subspecies, thereby hampering enforcement.
The recognition of varying degrees of endangerment and the
adoption of regulatory provisions which reflect those differences con-
stitute C.I.T.E.S.' most significant innovations for the protection of
74. See generally, C.I.T.E.S.,supra note 10; H.R. REP. No. 167, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2557 [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT].
75. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 74, at 2561.
76. C.I.T.E.S., supra note 10, at preamble; Grove, supra note 7, at 294-96. C.I.T.E.S.
was created to reduce the smuggling of those species that were known to be endangered.
Id at 294.
77. See supra notes 26-27, and accompanying text.
78. E.L.I., supra note 12, at 380. See also, supra note 13.
79. See supra notes 59-60, and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of the derivation of the approximate figure of 9,700, see supra
notes 53-55.
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wildlife.8' Under reverse listing this categorization may not be as
effective as it is under direct listing. At best, the ramifications of
reverse listing are unknown.
B. EFFECTIVENESS
C.I.T.E.S. has been fairly effective in protecting wildlife82
despite the fact that it is limited to international trade and lacks an
effective enforcement mechanism. 83 No trade restriction will be com-
pletely effective unless consumers reduce their demand for endan-
gered species articles.84 Although C.I.T.E.S. does not and cannot
eliminate that demand, it does diminish its effects by curtailing the
importation of endangered species. By closing the market transpor-
tation system between smugglers and consumers, C.I.T.E.S. attempts
to defeat the demand for illegal species.
It is not clear whether the reverse listing format would afford
more effective control of illegal trade than does the current system.
Reverse listing will not provide a greater reduction in demand for
endangered species articles, nor will it help in closing the market
transportation system. Any reduction in the difficulties of enforce-
ment that reverse listing may provide must be balanced against the
possibility that reverse listing will diminish the protections that
direct listing provides because of its focus on endangered species and
its provisions for varying degrees of trade restriction.
Moreover, the effectiveness of reverse listing in the preventive
protection of species is questionable. Ideally, reverse listing would
protect species by focusing on them before they become endan-
gered.85 This theory relies on two assumptions: 1) that reverse list-
ing forces Convention members to examine all species of wildlife in
their countries in order to justify listing them; and 2) that if the Con-
vention adopts the reverse listing proposal, the rigorous overseeing
activities of the Convention would continue unabated. Neither
assumption is necessarily valid. A country might simply list a spe-
cies without performing the extensive investigation that would be
necessary to determine if greater protection is appropriate. The
more wildlife that a country must categorize, the more likely it is that
such an inadequate practice will occur. The expense and time neces-
81. See supra note 13.
82. Grove, supra note 7, at 296, 309.
83. Travalio and Clement, supra note 7, at 223. Neither of these drawbacks would be
affected by a change to reverse listing. C.I.T.E.S. would continue to rely upon each
member to enforce the treaty, and would lack a formal mechanism to enforce restrictions.
Finally, it would also lack the power to sanction any members that violated the treaty.
84. Grove, supra note 7, at 309.
85. See supra notes 75-6, and accompanying text.
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sary to compile extensive lists with varying degrees of protection
could be prohibitive. It would be overly burdensome for the Con-
vention to determine the appropriate restrictions to impose on trade
in each of 9,700 species. The Convention might, therefore, accept
member lists without sufficient analysis to decide whether the cate-
gorizations are appropriate. This tendency is less likely when only
700 species must be categorized. 86
A change to reverse listing would be expensive for the Conven-
tion, both in time and money. Drawing up new lists, deciding on
protections for each list, and getting a consensus on each species
could be costly. Given the lack of a clear benefit, adoption of a
reverse listing format would be a waste of the Convention's limited
resources.
87
CONCLUSION
C.I.T.E.S. has effectively reduced wildlife smuggling. Its listing
process, with provisions for varying degrees of protection, is the
major reason for its success. C.I.T.E.S. focuses on endangered spe-
cies, is enforceable, and is the best wildlife protection treaty to be
enacted since the international community first recognized the need
for international cooperation. 8
Reverse listing could alleviate some of the enforcement
problems that C.I.T.E.S. fails to resolve. At the same time, however,
reverse listing could retard progress toward other important goals. It
refocuses attention from endangered species to healthy ones, and
may not afford the varying degrees of protection that the current sys-
tem does. The listing of 9,700 species is, arguably, a process too
cumbersome to be a realistic endeavor. The direct listing of 700
endangered or threatened species is more practical and allows indi-
vidual countries to monitor the other species within their borders.
C.I.T.E.S. places monitoring and enforcement responsibilities on
member countries while the Convention serves as the information-
86. Currently, the Convention carefully scrutinizes every proposed amendment to
the C.I.T.E.S. appendices. During its 1981 meeting the Convention adopted only one-
half of the 92 proposed changes. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of
the Interior, ENDANGERED SPECIES TECHNICAL BULLETIN, April, 1981, at 3.
87. Reverse listing has an additional weakness. C.I.T.E.S. now covers all countries
in that it includes provisions restricting trade in species from non-member countries. See
C.I.T.E.S., supra note 10, at art. X; supra note 35, and accompanying text. Under reverse
listing, the Convention would have to enact a provision to cover species which are only
indigenous to non-member countries. This weakness could be eliminated by enacting
one of several possible provisions: I) allowing non-members to list species, 2) allowing
members wishing to import such species to recommend listing, or 3) permitting a general
exception to species indigenous only to non-member countries. Admittedly, this is a
minor weakness and does not significantly impair the effectiveness of reverse listing.
88. Travalio and Clement, supra note 7, at 222; Grove, supra note 7, at 309.
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gathering point. Reverse listing would not change this, but it might
hamper the Convention's ability to gather and organize the neces-
sary information due to the sheer quantity of species that would be
involved in the listing process.
C.I.T.E.S. must be effective if the world is to maintain its wild-
life resources. Reverse listing would not increase the effectiveness of
C.I.T.E.S. and might harm it. The Convention should, therefore,
reject the Australian proposal in favor of continuing the direct listing
system.
Martin L. Ditkof
